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Abstract. During the last decade, many Western economies reformed their welfare
systems with the aim of activating welfare recipients by increasing welfare-to-work
programmes (WTWP) and job-search enforcement. We evaluate the short-term effects of
three important German WTWP implemented after a major reform in January 2005
(‘Hartz IV’), namely short training, further training with a planned duration of up to three
months and public workfare programmes (‘One-Euro-Jobs’). Our analysis is based on a
combination of a large-scale survey and administrative data that is rich with respect to
individual, household, agency level and regional information. We use this richness of the
data to base the econometric evaluation on a selection-on-observables approach. We find
that short-term training programmes, on average, increase their participants’ employment
perspectives. There is also considerable effect heterogeneity across different subgroups of
participants that could be exploited to improve the allocation of welfare recipients to the
specific programmes and thus increase overall programme effectiveness.
JEL classification: J68.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade many Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment countries have faced increasing numbers of welfare claimants and reacted by
conducting welfare reforms (e.g. the US, Canada, the UK and Germany). Most
resulted in a shift from passive benefit payment towards increased job search and
work requirements imposed on welfare recipients, with the objective of encoura-
ging employment uptake and reducing welfare dependency. Welfare recipients are
obliged to participate in welfare-to-work programmes (WTWP), and they can be
sanctioned by means of benefit cuts in case of non-compliance.
Welfare research has traditionally focused on North America where welfare-to-
work efforts were considerably increased by the US states and the federal
government over the 1990s. They also played a key role in the Canadian self-
sufficiency project (SSP). In the course of the reforms, an extensive literature
evaluating the various welfare programmes and reforms has evolved: see, for
example, Blank (2002), Grogger and Karoly (2005) andMoffitt (2002) for a review of
the US welfare reforms and the related empirical literature, and Bitler et al. (2008)
for the SSP.
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In Europe, where unemployment insurance (UI) is usually more generous and
relative numbers of UI claimants are generally higher than in North America, the
literature has almost exclusively focused on the evaluation of programmes targeted
at UI rather than welfare recipients.1 However, the results are not easily extendable
to welfare recipients, because, due to UI eligibility rules, welfare recipients differ
systematically from UI claimants with respect to their labour market characteristics:
they either do not have enough work experience to claim UI or they exhausted their
UI claim because of long-term unemployment. These differences may be particularly
relevant as the programmes are shown to exhibit considerable effect heterogeneity
with respect to the characteristics of their participants, such as gender, education
and local labour market conditions (for Germany see, for instance, Caliendo et al.,
2005; Lechner et al., 2007; 2010; Wunsch and Lechner, 2008).
In Germany, a coherent system of welfare benefits and in particular WTWP was
only introduced at the beginning of 2005 with the so-called Hartz IV reform.2 It
constitutes a remarkable change in German welfare policy and has drawn
considerable public attention. In this paper, we provide early evidence on the
short-run effects of the three most important of the newly introduced WTWP: (i)
short training that includes basic job-search assistance, work tests and minor
adjustment of general skills; (ii) short further training that aims at improving
occupation-related skills; and (iii) a workfare programme, called One-Euro-Jobs, that
aims at improving the employability of welfare recipients with relatively bad
employment prospects.
So far, there exist only two studies that analyse the effects of some of these
programmes: Wolff and Jozwiak (2007) investigate the effect of participation of
welfare recipients in short-term training, and Hohmeyer and Wolff (2007) evaluate
the effectiveness of One-Euro-Jobs.3 Based on administrative data, they analyse
programmes starting directly after the reform in early 2005. Among other issues
that hamper the evaluation of the future effects of programmes using data from its
introduction, this period was characterized by strong data collection problems,
which may have affected their results, for instance due to large amounts of missing
data raising concerns about representativeness and bias resulting from mis-
measured variables.
Here, we consider more recent programmes that started between October 2006
andMarch 2007, when these problems did not occur. We use more informative data
than the earlier studies and evaluate short further training as well. Furthermore, we
investigate effect heterogeneity in a detailed way and analyse a variety of outcome
variables. Finally, we assess the optimality of the allocation process of welfare
recipients to the different programmes to investigate whether there is scope for
improvement in employment and welfare dependency rates.
1. See, for example, the surveys by Kluve (2006), Kluve and Schmidt (2002), Martin and Grubb (2001)
and Wunsch (2006).
2. Many other European countries have recently conducted welfare reforms. Surveys on welfare
reforms in Europe are provided by Halvorsen and Jensen (2004), Kildal (2001) and Torfing (1999) for
the Nordic countries; Beaudry (2002), Dostal (2008) and Finn (2000) for the UK; Finn (2000) and
Knijn (2001) for the Netherlands; and Jacobi and Kluve (2007), Konle-Seidl et al. (2007) andWunsch
(2006) for Germany.
3. The following recent papers investigate other policies targeted specifically at German welfare
recipients: Bernhard et al. (2008) study wage subsidies, Wolff and Nivorozhkin (2008) investigate
start-up programmes and Schneider (2008) analyses benefit sanctions.
German Welfare-to-Work Programmes
r 2010 The Authors
German Economic Review r 2010 Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik 183
Our analysis is based on a combination of rich survey, administrative and
regional data that allows estimation of the programme effects using matching
techniques. We use the adjusted calliper propensity score matching estimator
proposed by Lechner et al. (2010). For up to 17 months after the start of the
programme, we find no significant effects of the programmes on average welfare
dependency rates. With respect to employment, we find positive and significant
effects for some programmes and some groups of participants, in particular for
short training and for non-migrant welfare recipients. Our assessment of the
optimality of programme assignment shows that there is considerable scope for
improvement in employment and welfare dependency rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some
background on the relevant institutions in Germany. In Section 3, we introduce the
data, followed by a discussion of the sample definition, the programmes and
participation patterns. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics of the evaluation
sample. Identification and estimation of the effects of interest as well as the
simulation of alternative treatment allocations are discussed in Section 5. In Section
6, we present the effect estimates and simulation results. Section 7 concludes.
2. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY
SINCE 2005
2.1. German welfare policy
In Germany, a coherent system of welfare benefits and WTWP was only introduced
at the beginning of 2005 with the so-called Hartz IV reform. Before that, there
existed two parallel systems. On the one hand, unemployed individuals who had
exhausted their UI claim were eligible for means-tested unemployment assistance
that replaced up to 57% of their previous net earnings. They were administered by
the local employment agencies of the federal public employment service (PES) and
had access to all labour market programmes available to UI recipients. On the other
hand, needy individuals who were never eligible for UI payments received a means-
tested lump-sum social assistance payment whose amount depended on household
composition and income. They were administered by the municipalities and
WTWP were basically non-existent for this group of people.
The Hartz IV reform removed this asymmetry for needy individuals who do not
receive UI payments.4 Unemployment and social assistance have been combined
to one single means-tested welfare payment that is independent of previous
earnings. Instead, its level depends on household size, composition and income
similar to the former social assistance [so-called unemployment benefits II (UB II)].5
Eligibility for UB II depends on being physically and mentally capable of working
for at least 15 hours per week, active job search and willingness to participate in
WTWP. Non-compliance with these rules, or the rejection of acceptable job offers,
can be sanctioned by means of temporary benefit cuts. The new welfare payments
4. Jacobi and Kluve (2007) provide an excellent survey of the reform package.
5. UB II amounted to h351 for a single-person household in January 2009. This is less generous than
unemployment assistance (on average h550 in 2003 in West Germany) but more generous than
social assistance (about h300); see Ochel (2005). On top of UB II, welfare payments also include rents
and housing costs (on average ca. h180 per person; see http://www.pub.arbeitsagentur.de/hst/
services/statistik) and compulsory social insurance contributions. Further costs for special needs
might be covered as well.
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and WTWP are in most cases administered by joint ventures between the local
employment office of the PES and the municipality, thus also the asymmetry in
administration has been removed. However, in 69 out of 429 offices, the agencies
are run by the municipality alone, entirely outside of the responsibility and
competency of the PES. In this study, we only consider the regular joint ventures for
which data availability is much better.
The Hartz IV reform came into effect in a period of mild recovery of the German
economy. After stagnation and a decline in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2002
and 2003, GDP grew moderately in 2004 (1.1%) and 2005 (0.8%). In 2006, GDP
growth was up to 2.9%, while 2007 saw a moderate slow down (2.5%).6 The number
of UB II recipients amounted to about 4.5 million in January 2005. About half of
these people were unemployed, the rest being the ‘working poor’. The number of
claimants increased steadily during 2005 and reached a peak of 5.5 million in April
2006. Since then it has declined to just below 5 million in August 2008.7
2.2. German WTWP
The Hartz IV reform constitutes a remarkable change in German welfare policy. For
the first time all welfare recipients are a target group of labour market activation. A
well-defined set of WTWP has been introduced for this group of people with the
primary objective to (re)integrate welfare claimants into the labour market as
quickly as possible and to reduce welfare dependency. Before 2005, no consistent
reintegration efforts were made. Thus, there is neither experience nor any evidence
on the efficiency of WTWP before the reform in 2005.8 In this paper, we evaluate
the effectiveness of the three most important German WTWP.
According to Table 1, which reports entries into German WTWP for the period
2005–2007 and the corresponding expenditures, so-called One-Euro-Jobs are by far
most frequently assigned, accounting for a third of overall expenditures, followed
by short-training courses and further training. One-Euro-Jobs are public sector-
related workfare programmes that were specifically introduced for unemployed
welfare recipients in 2005. According to the legislator, these programmes should be
of public interest and additional in the sense that the assigned work would
otherwise not be accomplished by existing companies.9 The workload typically
consists of 20–30 hours per week over a period of 3–12 months. Participants do not
receive a (subsidized) wage, but merely a compensation for job-related extra costs
which amounts to h1–2.5 per hour and which is paid in addition to UB II. One-Euro-
Jobs aim at restoring or improving the employability of their participants rather
than direct integration in the labour market. Accordingly, participants differ from
6. Figures according to the Federal Statistical Office (http://www.destatis.de).
7. Figures according to themonthly and annual reports of the FEA (http://www.arbeitsagentur.de). The
increase in claimants in 2005 was partly due to a considerable number of new applicants who never
applied for benefits before the reform because there was some stigma associated with applying for
social assistance.
8. As mentioned above, only unemployment assistance claimants had access to labour market
programmes. These were the same as the ones for UI claimants. The existing evaluation studies did
not distinguish between the two groups. See, for example, Wunsch (2006).
9. Critics who doubt the usefulness of workfare programmes therefore argue that they merely create
‘symbolic’, non-productive employment without providing marketable skills to the participants;
see, for example, Dostal (2008).
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participants in other WTWP in terms of worse labour market histories, in particular
longer and more frequent welfare dependency and, correspondingly, shorter and
less stable employment experience.
Short-Training courses are comparably cheap, albeit quantitatively important
programmes with durations of usually a few days to two weeks, but in any case no
more than 12 weeks. Their content is rather heterogeneous. First, they are used to
check the welfare recipients’ occupational aptitude and availability for the job
market, as well as to provide basic job-search assistance. Typical examples are
sample workdays as well as job application and job interview trainings. Second,
they are aimed at minor adjustments of general job relevant skills. The most
common examples are language courses and computer classes.
Further Training comprises a more substantial human capital investment and
focuses on the adaption of occupation-specific skills to recent labour market
developments, for example to mitigate skill mismatch due to structural change,
rather than general job- and search-related skills. The courses either take place as
classroom training, potentially in combination with short internships in firms, or
in so-called practice firms, that simulate a job in a specific profession. Planned
durations vary from a few months to up to three years.
The main components of the residual category ‘other programmes’ in Table 1 are
wage subsidies (paid to firms which employ difficult-to-place workers during the
first months of employment), start-up grants (bridging allowances for taking up
self-employment) and job placement services of private companies.
3. DATA AND DEFINITION OF SAMPLE AND PARTICIPATION STATUS
3.1. Data
Our analysis is based on a combination of very informative survey, administrative
and regional data. The core of these data is a survey of welfare recipients who have
Table 1 Entries in and expenditures for selected activation programmes
Category
Entries Expenditures in million h
2005 2006a 2007a 2005 2006 2007
One-Euro-Jobs and other
public employment
programmes
633,938 815,380 798,774 1,105 1,381 1,322
(12.7%) (15.1%) (15.1%) (35.3%) (36.0%) (31.3%)
Short training 410,884 480,675 545,960 158 164 163
(8.2%) (8.9%) (10.3%) (5.0%) (4.3%) (3.9%)
Further training 69,906 124,169 167,200 196 378 504
(1.4%) (2.3%) (3.2%) (6.3%) (9.8%) (11.9%)
Other programmes 592,682 849,912 974,233 1,666 1,918 2,233
(11.9%) (15.8%) (18.5%) (53.3%) (49.9%) (52.9%)
Total 1,707,410 2,270,136 2,486,167 3,125 3,841 4,221
Note: If not stated otherwise, figures are for joint ventures alone.
a Includes both joint ventures and agencies controlled by the municipality. In brackets, ratio of
programme participants to the average annual stock of employable welfare recipients (left panel) and
ratio to total expenditures (right panel), in per cent.
Source: Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency at http://www.pub.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/
statistik/detail/e.html; own calculations.
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been interviewed in two waves at the beginning ( January–April) and around the
end of 2007 (November–March 2008). It provides information on gender, age,
marital status, education, nationality, migration background, employment status,
welfare receipt, participation in WTWP, past performance on the labour market,
job-search behaviour and household information such as household composition
and employment status of each household member.
We use survey data for a stratified stock sample of 21,000 welfare recipients in
October 2006.10 Despite 93% of interviewees agreeing in the first wave to
participate in the follow-up interview, attrition was non-negligible, mainly due to
relocation problems and refusal to participate, yielding 11,276 panel cases.11 To
make up for these losses, a refreshment sample of 5,744 cases was drawn from the
same population as the original sample. The participants of the refreshment sample
had to answer retrospective questions to make up for the information collected
from the panel cases in the first wave. The data contain sample weights for each
individual that take into account both stratification and attrition.
The survey data have been merged with administrative data on welfare recipients
provided by Germany’s Federal Employment Agency for the period 1998–2007.
They combine spell information from social insurance records, programme partici-
pation records and the benefit payment and jobseeker registers of the PES. The ad-
ministrative database comprises individual characteristics (education, age, gender,
marital status, number of children, profession, nationality, disabilities and health),
the type and amount of benefits received, compliance with benefit rules, pro-
gramme participation (type, duration) and up to ten years of employment histories
(type of employment, industry, occupational status, earnings).
The combined administrative and survey data were linked to further data at the
agency and regional level. They include a wide range of indicators reflecting labour
market conditions (e.g. share of unemployed, long-term unemployed, welfare
recipients and migrants, GDP per worker, population density, industry structure)
and variables that characterize the agencies’ organizational structure (e.g. case
management and counselling concept, number and qualification of caseworkers,
welfare recipients per caseworker, placement strategy).
3.2. Sample and treatment definition
We restrict our analysis to welfare recipients in the panel and refreshment sample
who are administered by joint ventures between the local employment office of the
PES and the municipality because this is the most common case and because there
are severe problems with the quality of the administrative data for the other type of
administration. Moreover, we discard persons who did not agree to merge their
survey data with their administrative data. The first issue reduces the sample by
about one third to 11,260 observations, the second one by another 585 cases to
10,675 observations.
10. Stratification is based on age (15–24/25–49/50–64), children aged o3 in the household and lone
parent status.
11. Attrition is not random with respect to various characteristics including gender, education and
employment status. See the final project report for a detailed attrition analysis and how this
affected the construction of the sample weights (http://www.bmas.de/portal/30144/property=pdf/
f387__forschungsbericht.pdf ).
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Since we use a stock sample of welfare recipients in October 2006, we have
to restrict the analysis to programmes that start after the sampling date, as
the sampling procedure conditions on the outcome (failure) of programmes
attended before this date. Furthermore, as the survey data are only available up to
the second interview, and administrative records end in December 2007, we restrict
attention to the first programme that starts after the sampling date and before
April 2007 to have a follow-up period for measuring outcomes which is not too
short.
We define programme participation on the basis of the administrative data only
for programme starts before January 2007 as differences in the survey design
between the first wave of the panel and the refreshment sample imply that
programme starts can be consistently identified for all individuals in the survey
only from January 2007 onwards. Non-participants are defined as those individuals
not receiving any treatment between the sampling date in October 2006 and March
2007. This treatment definition leads to a sample of 8,091 non-participants, 656
participants in One-Euro-Jobs (mean duration seven months), 479 participants in
Short Training (mean duration one month) and 394 participants in Further Training
with planned durations of no more than three months (mean duration two
months). The latter restriction is imposed because of our short follow-up period.
Consequently, Short and Further Training have similar durations in our analysis but
differ with respect to their contents (improvement of job search or general skills vs.
occupation-specific skills). We do not impose a similar restriction on the duration
of One-Euro-Jobs because we only observe actual duration that is potentially
endogenous as welfare recipients are obliged to continue to job search and accept
job offers even while in a programme.
Starting with this sample, we make three further adjustments. First, since we
measure conditioning variables and outcomes relative to programme start, which is
only available for participants, we simulate hypothetical start dates for all non-
participants. We (i) regress the time between sampling and programme start on
individual characteristics12 in the pool of participants and (ii) use the coefficient
estimates along with randomly drawn residuals to predict the non-participants’
starting dates.13 We drop all non-participants from the analysis whose simulated
programme start date is outside the treatment window. Second, we ensure that only
individuals receiving welfare at the sampling date and just before the programme
start remain in the sample to ensure programme eligibility. Third, all individuals
not available to the labour market in the period before programme start due to
pregnancy, retirement, eased welfare receipt and (contemporaneous) long-term
health problems or severe disability are disregarded in the analysis.14 Table 2 shows
how the sample shrinks accordingly to 5,210 non-participants and about 350–600
participants in each group.
12. Variables related to the stratification, gender, education, marital status, variables reflecting the
employment state history and benefit receipt and regional variables are used as predictors.
13. This procedure has been suggested by Lechner (1999). The implemented version is analogous to
Wunsch and Lechner (2008).
14. We use both administrative and survey data to do this. Although in the survey part of the
information is retrospective (in particular for the refreshment sample) from the date when a
particular state began and ended is also available, which ensures that we do not condition on
outcome variables at this stage.
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4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 3 shows the mean characteristics of the four treatment groups in order to
investigate selectivity in programme participation.
Women constitute 59% of the non-participants but account for less than half of
the programme participants. Lone parents and individuals with children younger
than three are over-represented among non-participants, too. Moreover, with lower
shares of unskilled persons non-participants are better educated than participants.
In other respects, non-participants and participants in One-Euro-Jobs are similar but
differ from the other participants: average age is considerably higher and German
citizens are over-represented, while individuals with a migration background are
under-represented. With respect to regional differences, One-Euro-Jobs are more
extensively used in East Germany than Short and Further Training. Participants in
One-Euro-Jobs seem to have the worst labour market histories, as is indicated by
their frequent welfare receipt, repeated programme participation, fewer periods of
employment and a large share of unemployment. Participants in Short and Further
Training overall seem to be relatively similar with the exception of a somewhat
larger share of unskilled individuals in Further Training.
Figure 1 displays the proportion of individuals in the sample who receive welfare at
different points in time relative to the (simulated) programme start. Month 0 indi-
cates the programme start, 1 and 1 represent one month before and one month
after start, respectively. By construction everyone receives welfare directly before the
programme. Moreover, the similarity in dependency rates among participants and
non-participants in the six months before programme start results from the stock
sampling of welfare recipients in October 2006 in combination with the treatment
window and the procedure to simulate start dates for non-participants. However,
the rates before this indicate selectivity in programme participation showing that
Table 2 Gross stock sample and final evaluation sample
Non-
participation
One-
Euro-Job
Short
Training
Further
Training
Stock sample 8,091 656 479 394
Simulated programme start for non-
participants is not between sampling
date and March 2007
1,466 – – –
Non-participants not receiving welfare
or in (old) programme at the
simulated start date
1,164 – – –
Not receiving welfare at sampling date
(October 2006)
40 32 44 32
Not receiving welfare just before
programme start
4 6 18 11
Reduced job search requirements:
pregnant, retired, ‘eased’ welfare
receipt, long-term health problems
and severely disabled
207 7 2 4
Final evaluation sample 5,210 611 415 347
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participants in One-Euro-Jobs seem to be the worst risks in terms of welfare depen-
dency, followed by non-participants and participants in the training courses.
The dependency rates after programme start are not corrected for potential selec-
tivity. Still, they can provide first hints at possible programme effects. The ordering
of the four groups is preserved but the difference relative to non-participants
widens and becomes larger than in the pretreatment period for participants in both
types of training, in particular for Further Training. For One-Euro-Jobs it remains
relatively constant.
5. ECONOMETRICS
5.1. Programme effects of interest and identification
We are interested in identifying the average effects of participation in one of the
three programmes vs. non-participation for the respective population of partici-
Table 3 Selected descriptive statistics (shares in % in subsample)
Subsample
Non-
participation
One-Euro-
Job
Short
Training
Further
Training
Observations 5,210 611 415 347
Individual characteristics
Woman 59 46 47 49
Lone parent 22 15 15 15
Child below age 3 in household 24 11 15 17
Age in years 39 40 34 34
Married 38 31 35 35
Health limitations 15 17 13 13
German citizenship 85 90 80 78
Migrant or child of migrant(s)a 30 23 34 33
East Germany 19 23 16 18
Education
No vocational degree 41 45 45 48
Completed apprenticeship training 44 50 45 38
Polytechnical college or university
degree
4 3 2 5
Labour market history
Months of welfare receipt since 2005 16.7 17.8 16.0 16.2
Months of minor employment up to
h400 since 2005
2.7 1.5 2.3 1.7
Months of regular employment since
2005
1.8 1.1 1.4 1.8
Months of unemployment since 2005 14.3 13.5 12.8 13.1
Months of programme participation
since 2005
1.7 4.8 3.1 2.8
No employment since 1998 35 30 35 36
No programme participation since 1998 46 19 37 35
Fraction of time unemployed since 1998 31 31 26 27
Note: Entries are means and, if not stated otherwise, in per cent. All variables are calculated from
administrative records and are measured at the time when the sample was defined (October 2006).
a Partly from survey data. Further descriptive statistics are available from the authors on request.
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pants, i.e. the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). Ideally, we would like
to know the potential outcomes for all states and for each individual (see Rubin,
1974 for an early discussion of the potential outcome framework). However, only
the outcome under the treatment that was actually received is observed. Therefore,
ATETs are generally not identified without additional assumptions.
Our identification strategy is based on the assumption that we observe all factors
that jointly affect selection into the programmes and outcomes [conditional
independence assumption (CIA)]. If it holds, then the potential outcomes are
independent of the treatment conditional on these observed factors. Instead of
directly conditioning on the covariates, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown
that identification is equivalently obtained by conditioning on a so-called
balancing score, such as the conditional probability to participate in a programme
given the covariates (propensity score). This is useful to circumvent the curse of
dimensionality related to a non-parametric regression using a high-dimensional
covariate vector.
5.2. Plausibility of the CIA in this study
As the CIA is not testable, we need to establish its plausibility from an analysis of
the selection process. In our context, the selection process lies formally in the
hands of the caseworkers. They assign welfare recipients to WTWP that are, in
principle, compulsory, even though there is a limited possibility for bargaining
between the caseworker and the welfare recipient. Jacobi and Kluve (2007) point
out that recent welfare reforms have further increased the caseworkers’ power over
their clients to improve the targeting of activation measures.
Post-reform programme allocation is related to a profiling process based on an
interview in which the caseworker screens the welfare recipient’s skills, deficiencies
0.7
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1
–9 –8 –7 –6 –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Nonparticipants One-Euro-Jobs Short Training Further Training
Figure 1 Welfare receipt before and after programme start before matching
Note: Horizontal axis: months relative to programme start (month 0).
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and labour market perspectives. The welfare recipient is subsequently classified
according to her employment chances. This classification also influences the types
of programmes she might potentially be assigned to. As noted by Jacobi and Kluve
(2007), Short Training is targeted very broadly at those with reasonable employment
prospects. Further Training should be provided to those who benefit most from the
newly provided skills and is mainly targeted at individuals with good labour market
prospects. One-Euro-Jobs are targeted at welfare recipients with otherwise very
limited employment chances. They are frequently used in regions with particularly
bad labour market conditions.
Given the wealth of individual and household information outlined in Section
3.1, our data are very well suited to capture the factors that determine individual
employment prospects. In particular, we not only observe the standard character-
istics like age, gender, marital status, household composition, nationality,
migration, education and profession, but also health and disability information.
Moreover, we reconstruct the frequency, duration and quality of employment,
unemployment, benefit receipt and programme participation of each individual
from January 1998 to December 2007. What is lacking in our data are direct
measures of individual motivation, attitudes and aptitude. It is, however, likely that
these characteristics are relatively persistent over time such that they had an impact
on labour market success before the programme start. For this reason, it is crucial
that we are able to condition on individual employment histories in
a detailed way. This is also emphasized by Card and Sullivan (1988) and Heckman
et al. (1998).
Furthermore, even though the profiling process is standardized, the organiza-
tional structure of the agencies might play a role in the judgement of which
programme is considered to be most appropriate. We control for such differences by
using agency level information about the form of case management, the number
and the qualification of caseworkers and the number of welfare recipients per
caseworker, among other factors.
Moreover, local labour market conditions are also crucial for employment
prospects. Our data contain a large variety of measures of local labour market condi-
tions including – among many others – unemployment, vacancies, GDP per
worker, industry structure, migration, remoteness and distance from the next big
city. Thus, we are confident that we capture all major factors that affect both selec-
tion into the programmes and our labour market outcomes of interest.
5.3. Estimation of the programme effects
We use propensity score matching to estimate the programme effects. An advantage
of these estimators is that they are semi-parametric and that they allow arbitrary
individual effect heterogeneity (see Heckman et al., 1999; Imbens, 2004 provides an
excellent survey of the recent advances in this field).
We apply a matching procedure that incorporates the improvements suggested
by Lechner et al. (2010). Compared with nearest-neighbour matching, this
procedure is more precise because it incorporates the idea of calliper or radius
matching (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) into the algorithm. Furthermore,
matching quality is improved by exploiting the fact that appropriate weighted
regressions that use the sampling weights from matching have the so-called double
robustness property: the estimator remains consistent if either the matching step is
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based on a correctly specified selection model, or the regression model is correctly
specified (e.g. Joffe et al., 2004; Rubin, 1979). Moreover, this procedure should
reduce small sample bias as well as asymptotic bias of matching estimators (see
Abadie and Imbens, 2006) and thus increase robustness of the estimator. The actual
matching protocol can be obtained from the authors on request.15
As discussed in Section 3.2, our sample is not randomly drawn from the
population. Since we are interested in ATETs and since participation is not random,
we cannot simply use the sample weights that account for stratification and
attrition. Rather, we have to compute the probability of being part of a particular
subpopulation conditional on treatment status. When calculating the mean
potential outcomes in each treatment state, this probability has to be multiplied
with the weight of the individual obtained by matching (1 for treated). We exploit
that if stratification and attrition are independent of the participation status, it
suffices for the consistency of the first-step estimation of the propensity scores to
include all characteristics used to compute the sample weights as explanatory
variables (see Manski and Lerman, 1977).
We use the fixed-weight standard error estimator proposed by Lechner et al.
(2010). It is the same as the one suggested by Lechner (2001) and applied in Gerfin
and Lechner (2002) and Lechner (2002), except that heteroscedasticity is allowed
for. See Lechner and Wunsch (2009) for the motivation and all details of this
variance estimator that shows some resemblance to the estimator suggested by
Abadie and Imbens (2006).
5.4. Simulating alternative allocations of welfare recipients to programmes
To answer the question whether programmes are targeted efficiently, we investigate
the optimality of the allocation process. In contrast to the identification of ATETs,
which is based on mean potential outcomes, the determination of the optimal
allocation of welfare recipients into various programmes requires the knowledge of
the potential outcomes of all treatments (including non-participation) for each
individual in the sample.
Our approach to predict the unobserved counterfactuals is similar to the one in
Lechner and Smith (2007). Four aspects have to be taken into account. First,
selection has to be controlled for, again by conditioning on the propensity scores.16
Second, the potential outcomes have to be predicted as accurately as possible,
15. We estimate the propensity scores by probit specifications. Among individual characteristics,
gender, age, marital status, children younger than three, nationality and education appeared to be
good predictors for selection into treatment. Individuals aged 50–64 are less likely to participate in
any programme, and children under three decrease the probability of being assigned to further
training. Furthermore, variables related to the employment history have considerable explanatory
power. They include the last occupation, duration of the last minor or regular employment, time in
employment since 2005, time in programmes since 1998, average programme duration and
number of programmes since 2005, time spent out of the labour force since 1998, number of
months in welfare receipt between sampling date and start date. Also regional variables
characterize the treatment assignment (e.g. a large proportion of long-term unemployed increases
the likelihood to be assigned to One-Euro-Jobs). The exact specifications and results are available on
request.
16. The estimation of the propensity scores is based on the multiple treatment framework by Imbens
(2000) and Lechner (2001) using probit models for the pairwise comparisons of all programmes
against each other as well as non-participation.
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including characteristics observed by the caseworkers suspected to influence their
decision to allocate the welfare recipients. We therefore include vocational degree,
regional characteristics and variables reflecting the employment history as
predictors. Third, due to the high dimensionality of the characteristics to be
accounted for, non-parametric estimation of the potential outcomes is infeasible.
Therefore, we use probit specifications for the potential outcome predictions, as the
outcome variables are binary. Fourth, all characteristics used to compute the sample
weights have to be included in the probit specifications, too, for the estimation to
be consistent for a sample subject to stratification and attrition. To obtain
representative average potential outcomes, the individual potential outcomes are
multiplied with the respective sample weight.
Estimation of the coefficients required to predict the potential outcomes is based
on the subsample in the respective treatment group. In each group, the binary
outcome is estimated as a function of the propensity scores for all relevant
comparisons, the variables used in the computation of weights and characteristics
observed by the caseworkers who decide on programme allocation. The coefficient
estimates are then used to predict the potential outcomes for all individuals in the
sample and this is done for all treatments. Based on the predicted potential
outcomes, the results for different allocation rules regarding the assignment of
welfare recipients into the programmes are simulated.
One cautionary note though: the probit coefficients are estimated rather
imprecisely due to small sample sizes in One-Euro-Jobs, Short Training and Further
Training. This is not accounted for in the optimal allocation, which is determined
by comparing the potential outcomes for each individual and choosing the best
one. In particular, we do not test whether differences in potential outcomes are
statistically significant. In the interpretation of the results, we therefore have to
bear in mind that the potential outcomes are estimated with higher uncertainty for
programme participants than for non-participants.
6. RESULTS
6.1. Effects of the programmes
From a policy perspective, the main objectives of WTWP are reducing welfare
dependency and increasing employment rates. We measure the corresponding
outcome variables of interest using both administrative and survey information.
6.1.1. Outcomes constructed from administrative data
From the administrative data we construct half-monthly measurements of welfare
dependency starting with the first period after programme start. Focusing on the
beginning rather than the end of the programme accounts for endogeneity of
actual programme durations as welfare recipients are obliged to continue to job
search and accept job offers even while in a programme. We observe outcomes for
all individuals in the sample up to nine months after programme start. This period
is relatively short but this is the cost of looking at very recent programmes. However,
the half-monthly measurements allow us to analyse the short-run dynamics of the
effects, thus potentially providing first indications of trends of the effects in later
periods. Moreover, they allow us to pick up potential lock-in effects of the
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programmes (cf. Lechner et al., 2007; 2010; van Ours, 2004; Wunsch and Lechner,
2008).
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the effects of the programmes on welfare
dependency compared with non-participation for the first nine months after
programme start. It turns out that within this period none of the programmes
significantly reduces welfare dependency. Only for Short Training does the effect
stabilize at a reduction of about 5 percentage points but the effect is still not
significant.17 We have to bear in mind that sample sizes are too small to detect
significant effects of the programmes (standard errors vary between 0.06 and
0.07). Thus, concluding from the results that the programmes are ineffective
would not be appropriate. Unfortunately, the administrative information on
employment is missing after 2006 so that we cannot consider this outcome based
on administrative data.
6.1.2. Outcomes constructed from survey data
The second set of outcomes is constructed from the second wave of the survey,
more specifically from the self-reported employment status at the time of the
second interview. Even though we observe all outcomes of interest, there are also
–0.06
–0.04
–0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Welfare receipt
Figure 2 Dynamics of the effects compared to non-participation (in % points/100)
Note: Horizontal axis: months after programme start. Significance: effect is significant on the 5% level
(point-wise). Outcomes are calculated from administrative records from one to nine months after
programme start. Standard errors vary between 0.06 and 0.07.
17. Unfortunately, we cannot investigate whether there are positive long-run effects of participation in
a sequence of programmes. Besides looking at a very short outcome window, our sample is too
small to account for dynamic treatment effects as suggested, for example, by Lechner (2009).
However, it is not very likely that there are positive effects in the long run because the estimated
(insignificant) effects of programmes on welfare receipt are quite stable in the last three months of
our observation period and do not indicate any future change.
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drawbacks related to the survey data. For each individual, the second interview
differs with respect to the month it took place and with respect to its distance to the
programme start. This distance varies between 7 and 17 months. Thus, when
measuring outcomes based on the survey data, we pick up a mixture of short- (in
particular of potential lock-in effects) and longer run effects.
The results in Figure 2 concerning welfare dependency are confirmed when
looking at the self-reported employment status at the time of the second interview
in Table 4: the effects indicate a small (given the levels) reduction in welfare
dependency of 3–5 percentage points for the training courses but they are not
significant. With respect to employment, we find positive and significant average
effects for participants in Short Training. With 9% points and a counterfactual
mean employment rate of 22%, this effect is large and it seems that the gain is in
terms of ‘self-sufficient’ employment (individuals who are employed but not
welfare dependent). For the other programmes, especially for Further Training, there
are some indications of positive employment effects as well but they are not
significant.
Potential reasons for the ineffectiveness of One-Euro-Jobs in the short run are
negative lock-in effects. In our sample, One-Euro-Jobs have a mean duration of seven
months with several individuals participating 9–12 months. Thus, the second
interview takes place when a non-negligible fraction of participants is still in the
programme, or very shortly thereafter. While accomplishing a lengthy One-Euro-Job,
individuals are likely to reduce their job-search effort relative to non-participants
who have more time to seek employment. This argument is in line with Graversen
(2003), who estimates relatively large lock-in effects for public WTWP in Denmark.
Moreover, the objective of One-Euro-Jobs is to restore or improve employability
rather than direct re-employment so that also, for this reason, the follow-up period
may be too short to detect employment effects.
6.2. Effect heterogeneity
In this section, we investigate whether there are some groups of participants that
particularly benefit from the programmes. For example, we are interested in
whether the programmes help those groups of welfare recipients that face
particularly severe problems in reducing welfare dependency. For this purpose,
we estimate programme effects in strata defined by gender, age, presence of small
children in the household, lone-parent status, region and migration background.
The results are displayed in Table 5. Note, however, that the samples are too small
to draw definite conclusions from insignificant effects.
In contrast to the average effects, we find positive and weakly significant
employment effects for male participants in One-Euro-Jobs who are not lone parents
and who do not have a migration background. However, this employment does not
seem to be self-sufficient, i.e. pay enough to eliminate welfare dependency.
Moreover, the differences in the respective groups with opposite characteristics are
small so that it cannot be concluded from the results that one group really benefits
more than the other.
The positive average effects of Short Training on self-sufficient employment seem
to stem predominantly from participants who are either young or elderly, who have
small children or who have no migration background. For the latter as well as for
East Germans, it also seems that minor employments that pay no more than h400
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per month have been reduced in favour of regular insured employment. In
contrast, the employment effect for participants with small children seems to stem
from a substantial increase in minor employments.
For Further Training, we now find evidence for positive employment effects for
young participants and individuals without a migration background.
6.3. Optimal allocation of welfare recipients to programmes
Given that the programmes exhibit effect heterogeneity with respect to participant
characteristics, we investigate whether caseworkers send those welfare recipients to
the programmes who benefit most. Focusing on the two most important outcome
variables, i.e. welfare dependency and self-sufficient (self-) employment, we
compare the average outcomes of different allocations of welfare recipients with
programmes using predictions of the respective outcome variable as a function of
characteristics for each individual in our evaluation sample.
Table 6 presents the mean outcomes of the actual allocation and three
alternatives for cost-neutral re-allocations that keep the share of participants in
each programme group constant. The first interesting result is that the caseworker
allocation and a random allocation yield very similar results for both outcomes of
interest. However, caseworkers still do considerably better than in the worst-case
scenarios, which would yield a 5 percentage point higher rate of welfare
dependency or an about 4 percentage point lower employment rate. The overall
scope for improvement by switching to the optimal allocation is, for both
outcomes, about 9 percentage points, which indicates a substantial inefficiency of
the allocation process.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We use a unique dataset that combines rich survey, administrative and regional
data to provide early evidence on the short-run effects of the three most important
WTWP used in Germany since the last major welfare reform in 2005, which
constitutes the starting point for labour market activation of welfare recipients in
Germany. On the one hand, we investigate Short and Further Training with a
planned duration of up to three months that aim at increasing employment rates
and reducing welfare dependency. On the other hand, we analyse workfare
programmes, called One-Euro-Jobs, that aim at improving the employability of
Table 6 Mean outcomes for different allocations
Welfare receipt
Employment or self-employment
w/o welfare receipt
Actual allocation 78.65 14.37
Random assignment 77.98 15.13
Outcome maximization 83.79 23.28
Outcome minimization 69.50 10.06
Difference between optimal and
actual policy
9.15 8.91
Note: Entries are in per cent. Shaded cells indicate the optimal policy.
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welfare recipients with particularly bad employment prospects with the hope of
reducing welfare dependency in the longer run. We look at programmes that were
conducted between October 2006 and March 2007, and consider short-run
outcomes up to 17 months after programme start.
On average, we do not find significant effects of all three programmes on future
welfare dependency within our follow-up period. Only Short Training, which is a
combination of job-search assistance, work tests and minor improvements of
general skills, has a significantly positive effect on self-sufficient employment on
average. Thus, one may be tempted to conclude that, at least in the short run,
the newly introduced German WTWP do not reduce welfare dependency and
increase employment only in the case of Short Training. However, there is also
some indication that the training courses may reduce welfare dependency and that
Further Training also has some positive employment effects. Our sample sizes are
too small to draw definite conclusions based on the estimated effects
being insignificant. Moreover, our evaluation window is too short to draw any
conclusions with respect to mid- and long-term effects, especially for the workfare
programme.
The findings are in line with the existing literature on similar programmes in
other countries, though. Re-evaluating California’s Greater Avenues for Indepen-
dence (GAIN) program, Hotz et al. (2000) find that a focus on job-search assistance
and a ‘work first’ approach is more effective with respect to employment than basic
skills training one to three years after the respective programme, even though the
superiority decreases in later periods. For the New Deal for Young People in the
United Kingdom, Dorsett (2006) finds that two years after programme start job
placements into the voluntary sector (which resemble public workfare pro-
grammes) and full-time education/training for the individuals without basic
qualifications appear to be less successful than subsidized employment in the
private sector. Graversen (2003) finds for Denmark that placement into the public
sector yields a smaller employment effect and entails longer welfare dependency
than placement into the private sector.
The average effects hide some considerable effect heterogeneity, though. There
are several subgroups of participants that do benefit from the programmes. We find
positive and weakly significant employment effects for participants in One-Euro-Jobs
who are men, who are not lone parents and who are not migrants. Short and Further
Training are effective for young participants and non-migrants. In addition, Short
Training also shows positive employment effects on the elderly and people with
small children.
Given this effect heterogeneity, we investigate whether caseworkers send those
welfare recipients to the programmes who would benefit most from participating in
the respective programmes. We find that the observed allocation is not optimal in
terms of welfare receipt and employment. An optimal targeting of programmes that
keeps the share of participants in each programme type and hence programme
costs constant would reduce welfare dependency by about 9 percentage points and
would increase employment by a similar amount.
The results of this paper shed light on the short-term effects of the three
quantitatively most important WTWP used since the Hartz IV legislation. However,
sample sizes are too small to draw definite conclusions about the short-run
effectiveness of the programmes. Further research is also required to evaluate long-
term effects of a broader range of activation measures. This will eventually allow a
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judgement of the overall effectiveness of an important component of the recent
welfare reforms in Germany.
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